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INTERTEMPORAI. EFFICIENCY ANE) THE
WORLD PRICE OF OIL AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
BRoni RI' A. MARSIIAII.A4
This article preset! Is an empirical depletable resourcc,c model which culculaze.c the eflicieni tinie
paths of world oil price and suppl'. Besides rising dynamic demand Junctions, the model is eali-
brasedlo the results of large scale market equilibrium models based on econometric studies and
engineering cost data.Sensitivitytests are made for asSUF?!ptiofls regarding interest rates, es_
traction costs. variations in OPEC' undiscovered recoverable resources, and variationsin
soarces. prices, and timing of synthetic liquids. A key conclusion is that mnonopoh' rents, rathcr
than scarcitt rents are accruing to OPEC nations.
I. INrRODUCTI0N
In recent years the adequacy of the world resource base relative to his-
torical growth patterns is a matter that has been thrust into the public's
attention. No aspect of this issue has commanded a greater sense of
urgency than the ultimate depletability of world oil supplies and the ne-
cessity of eventually converting world energy demand from reliance ott oil
to other fuel sources. The nature and timing of this conversion will be
affected in large part by the time path of world oil price through its effects
on demand, oil extraction rates and the development of substitute source
industries. Should oil be priced too low, oil supplies could be essentially
depleted before alternative sources were competitively available. How-
ever, inefliciency would also result from prices which were too high. De-
velopment of alternative energy technologies would be over-accelerated,
leading to transition to expensive new energy sources while lower cost oil
remains forever unused, and to inelilcient allocation of capital and other
resources.
The theory of depletable resources characterizes a time path of
scarcity renis which, if included in the price of a depletable energy re-
source, would lead to efficient consumption patterns, and a "smooth"
transition to alternative energy sources (i.e, no abrupt price increases or
shortages occur when the givenresource is exhausted). '[he basic result is,
of course, well known, dating backto Hotelling [3]. The scarcity rents
must grow at the rate of return to capital in the same risk class as the oil
resources. Only then would competitive suppliers be at the point of indif-
ference between selling oilor holding it in the ground as an investment.
For efficiency, the initial scarcityrent must be just large enough so that
Ilie work reported in this paper was done while the author was at the Office of Energy
Systems Modelling and 1-orecasting, Federal Energy Administration, Washington. l).C.
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acting through the demand function, the resourceis intertemporally
rationed so as to exhaust it precisely at the tinie andprice at which world
demand for it reaches zero. (A survey of the literature ondepletable re-
sources can be found in Peterson and Hchcr [ lO].)
It is to he noted, however, that scarcity rents areentirely distinct from
nonopoIs' rents which derive from the market powerof resource pro-
ducers. The potential existence of rents other than true scarcity rents
makes it difficult to evaluate the etliciency of actual numerical prices on
the basis of the theoretical results alone.
This study attempts to calculate quantitatively the intemporally
efficient time paths of world oil price and supply by using an empirical de-
pletable resources model. A prominent kature of the model is that it em-
ploys dynamic demand functions which are calibrated to the "pseudo-
data' results of large scale comprehensive energy market equilibrium
models. The model explicitly represents world demand for and supply of
liquid fuel sources, namely crude oil and synthetic liquids From coal
and/or shale. While the economic interactions between liquids supply
and demand and other types of fuelsgaseous, solid, electricity --are not
explicitly represented, the advantages of a fuller equilibriumtreatment are
not entirely lost because of the links to the larger models. The change in
demands for and supplies of a liquid fuel source due to a change in the
price of oil is not here a celeris paribus effect; rather, it is the change after
the prices of all other energy sources and products have shifted so as to re-
store equilibrium. The procedure of calibrating the model to the larger
models' "pseudo-data" is explained in Section III.
The model is actually used to compute the competitive oil price,
which under certain assumptions would be equivalent to the efficient
price. While supply decisions are modeled normatively (as if OPEC were
composed of ideal competitive suppliers), demand is econometrically
based; ic., consumers are modeled as they are, not as they "should" be.
The pure competitive assumption of perfect foresight, therefore, does not
hold. The implications are discussed in Section IV.
The key empirical result of this study is that the intertemporally
efficient world oil price is substantially below the prevailing level; i.e., the
greatest part of rents accruing to the oil producing countries of OPEC can
be interpreted as monopoly rents, as opposed to scarcity rents. The same
qualitative result has been attained beforeinvarious studies(e.g.,
Adeleman II), Nordhaus[8], Cremer and Weitzman 12], Pindyck [II]), al.
diGugh quantitatively the results do differ for a multitude of reasons. Due
to space limitations a brief statement of the current study's merits wil
have to take the place of a comparative discussion. On empirical grounds
the parameters of this model, unlike the others, are calibrated to the rc
suIts of large scale energy market equilibrium models based on econo
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metric and engineeringcost data. On structural grounds, the advantages
of the presentmodel arc that it includes a much more realistic treatment
of demandand the development and phase-in of substitute liquid fuel
sources in the senseof modeling dynamics and price effects.
11. THE[)EPI.ETABIFREsouRcE: MODE!.
The normative part of the model concerns only the OPEC crude oil
producers. OPEC demand is modeled as the residual of several world
regional demands for liquid fuel sources, minus non-OPEC oil supplies
and liquid synthetic fuel supplies (which eventually fill the demand for
liquid fuels when oil supplies are exhausted). The regional demands and
non-OPEC supplies are determined by dynamic functions which depend
on current and all past prices. Given this demand function OPEC is
modeled as if it were aprice-takingprofit maximizing supplier. Marginal
extraction cost is presumed to be an increasing function of cumulative
extraction.
To the OPEC supplier, for a given time path of prices, (Pi,P2'. ..) cc
(denoted p,I) the problem is:
!fl
C




nt subject to: q q1 I2
fly where: = OPEC extraction, period z
be.
..q, = cumulative extraction through timeI
C(Q,)= unit extraction cost
Lily r= interest rate
the Q = OPEC reserves plus undiscovered recoverable resources
can If the availability constraint is active there will usually besome finite
Line T such thatq = 0 for i >Tand 7i..,q.= .Tis called the exhaus-
.g., tion date.
al- Meanwhile, OPEC demand is modeledas a function of prices. Again,
)ue fora given time path ofprices, p,], demand is calculated in each period as:
will
nds
(I) = x,(p,p2.....p,)t = 1,2,3,...
re- To solve the problem,one must find a time path of prices so that the sys-
no. tenis in problem (C) andequations (I) generate identical quantities in




Thewellknownform of solution toa problem of this generic type is
that therice when q,>0should equalthe marginal extraction cost,,
plus a scarcity rent which rises at the rate of interest,'
p,= )'-f Ml
where X=initial scarcity rent
=availability constraint multiplier from problem (C).
What makes this particular formulation interesting is (a)i/u'method
oleoipirieally ealihiating OPEC th',nand.to be discussed in the next sec-
tion; and, (h)the di'namie.c.The dynamics of interest are in the OPEC dc-
matid and extraction cost functioi. The linkages between periods there
make it impossible to calculate anything recursively. The entire time paths
need to be considered simultaneously. (An appendix describing the com-
putational algorithm devised to solve the problem is available on request
from the author.)
Two interesting implications of the dynamic forms arc worth noting.
First, since extraction costs increase with cumulative depletion, the "full"
marginal cost, v1 in (3), is greater than current unit extraction cost, C(Q,):
= C(Q1) + C'(Q1)q1(l + p)iI
The second term on the right hand side is a user cost which accounts for
the fact that current extraction. q. makes all future extraction more costly.
(See Weinstein and Zeckhauser [14].)
The sccond point concerns the dt'nan,icsofdetermining the lime and
price of resource exhaustion. In the simplest case, one could consider that a
perfect substitute for oil, or "backstop technology," is available at some
cost, p,. The substitute, then, has an inlinitelv elastic supply curve at price
p. One knows in advance that the price of oil can never exceed p,. that
=p,, and further that oil'sscarcityrent atanytimeIbefore T is
Ipr - C(Q1)]( I + r)°'. One (ofseveral)reasonsthisisunrealis-
tic is that it takes no account of the substantial time lags required for de-
velopment of new technologies and new industries. Even if the price of o,I
'The scarcity rentjll turn out to he ,ero in the solution if the availahiktconstraIn
is inactive. in which case the resource is not intertemporaIlscarce re!attse to demand. SanC
may he an example of a depletable resource for sshich this is true,
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actually increasedsuddenly to twice the price necessaryto make SOITIe
w energy procesSeconomic, it might take several decadesto perfect the
processestablish commercial scale plants, and finally toiaII' displacethe
demand for oj!. Thisproblem can he partly solved by specifyingsome
date i beforewhich the substitute is unavailable, and possiblysonic time
varying "required price"path after 7, representing learning elrcctsin the
new industry-Then at least the price of oil would not he constrainedto
stay belowthe substitute cost before it is available. Yet, this is still un-
realistic because the pace of development of the flCW industry is still an
exogenous timeschedule. In fact, the past history of the price of oil, and
future priceexpectations based upon it, will have major influence on the
pace of developmentof the new industry.
The current model makes atttempt to represent these effects. To see
how consider the price path, (p73, where:
(5) p7Min$p:x,(p1,p2,.., p,,p) = 03
p7, to be called here the "sell-sulliciency" price, is the price above which
there is zero demand for OPEC oil. p7 will always exist in this particular
model by virtue of the form x takes. One can conceive of the problem (C)
as one of finding the initial scarcity rent A such that the price pathp,(
from (3) just meets the price path (p73 from (5) at the time when 3p,(,
acting through the demand function, exhausts all resources. This is repre-
sented graphically in Figure Il-I.
The (p73 path serves the function of the more simplistic cost-of sub-
stitute or backstop technology price but with the added feature that it
varies not only with time, hut is dependent on the whole past history of
oil prices. Changing (P,3 also changes 3 p73. The time and price at which
3p13 meets 3p73 is, in our model, the point of full transition from oil to
synthetic fuels. However, synthetic fuels begin being phased in long before
that point is actually reached, as will be clear after discussion of how syn-




























SandIll. DA1A ANt) CALIBRATIONOF FUNCTIONAl. l'oqis
The first three subsectionsbelow describe the functional forms
and
calibration procedures usedto construct OPEC demand. SubsectionsA
B and C discuss,respectivelY, demand for liquid fuel sources, Supplyof
non-OPEC oil and supply ofsynthetic liquid fuels. Subsection Ddescribes
the OPEC extraction costfunction and other parameters in the OPEC
supply model.
A. Demand
The "pseudo data" to which the presentmodel's demandfunctions
were calibrated arethe results of two much larger energy models. ihese
are the Federal EnergyAdministration's International Energy Evaluation
System (IEEES) [5] and the StanfordResearch Institute-Gulf Energy
Model (SRI-GEM) [13]. These models are integrated systems of sub-
models which trace energy prices and flows from resource extraction
through logistical systems arid conversion processes to final products arid
ultimately to various final demand sectors. The lEES model covers some
20 world regions comprising the non-Communist world, but has only been
run to give results through 1985. TheSRI-GEM model covers only the
United States, but results are available over a 50 year time period, and it
includes the most substantial modeling of the development of the syn-
thetic fuels industry currently available. A "result" from either of these
models is a snapshot of a competitive spatial energy market equiljbriwn
Each such "snapshot" result presumes some particular exogenous time
path of world crude oil price. The idea here is to extract from these
results the infot mation needed to construct a much smaller, but dynamic.
model in which crude oil prices are endogenous.
Liquid fuel source demand functions were constructed for four world2
regions: North America, other OECD, OPEC arid the rest of the non-
Communist world. These were calibrated to the lEES results3 through
1985 and the SRI-GEM4 results from 1986 through 2025. Non-US re-
gional demands after 1985 were devised by preserving the 1985 ratios to
US demand, and all demands after 2025 were based on assumed geometric
growth rates. A log-lineai- Koick-lag form was used for cach region:
(6) a', = J(d,)°(p)0
2The Communist bloc is treated onlyis a net exporter h' assuming an exogenoth
lime path of exports to the non-Communist world. See Table 111-2.
3Essentially, the lEES Jan. 19. 1976 "Businessas Usuulresults for 1980 and 1985 sere
used, except for modifications to account for expectedellects of recent legislation in the U.S.
4me calibration to SRI-GEMresults is based on results ui that model published in
Volume ii of "Recomntendations fora Synthetic Fuels Corn mcrciali,aiion Pnogram' bth
Synfuels interagency Task Force,a report prepared for the U.S. President's Energy Re






















where d, isdemand in period t and a, (3, and f areparameters chosen
to best fitthe results of the larger models. The lagged demand factorcap-
tures theinfluence of past prices and quantities on the psdemand.
(In fact, it is easily seenthat (6) can be transla'ed toa function of the form
dd(p1.....PJ.)The full adjustment of demand resulting froma lasting
price change evolves gradually over time, the speed of adjustment being
determined by the exponent, a. This adjustment process can be inter-
preted as representing the time ittakes COnSufliers and producersto
change consumption patterns, alter capital stocks and possibly redesign
technologies in response to a long term change in oil price.
The L/1 time paths were determined by observing the time paths of
liquid fuel demands forecasted by the larger models under a particular
time path of crude oil price. This price path and its associated demand
paths are hereinafter called "reference paths," and are denoted by a super-
script "0." (6) can be reduced to the following equivalent form:
(d\(d,j\O(p\
\(/Jd') tsp?)
Thus, the J, parameters are simply represented in terms of the reference
path variables.
The a and (3parameters, which represent a dynamic price sensitivity,
were fitted to lEES resulLs. Each of several alternative lEES constant
price paths can be considered as a price change at time zero from the
designated reference price path, which is maintained for n years. If the set
of resultant demands in year n are fitted to a constant elasticity func-
tional form, its elasticity,,,, can be interpreted as the n-year price elas-
ticity of demand:
= (3(1 + a + a2 + +a')
By calculatingfor two (or more) values ofnone obtains the simul-
taneous equations:
= (3(14- a -3--.+ a"I)
which can then be solved for a and (3. This process is repeated for each
demand region.
The "elasticities" represented by the ,,'s are not actually conventional
own-price elasticities because they give the change in demand due to a
change in own pricewhile a/biting other energy prices to adjust as needed
torestore equilihriu,n. Thus,while the model only explicitly represents
liquid fuel sources, which greatly simplifies it,itis a clear step ahead of






Speed of Adjustment,a 760
(for one year period)
TABLE Ill-I
I.itiç DISIANI) DAI A
dt'n,:uid (i\ Pt =









One Year Elasticity, - 0877 .0425 -03(83
Eong Run Elasticity/la -.3654 -.2560 - .1500
*Jf n-searperiods ,Ire used, theesponents have to be modified froma and ii to a and(I-s a + + tsI)
respectively
Reference Demand Pathsa
Other Non-OPEC Time l'eriod North America Other OECI) Non-O}CD OPEC
2.99 13.21 4.96 76 77 12.97 14.53 540 1.42 78 79 12.94 16.28 5.99 .72 80 8) 13.11 17.94 6.59 197 82 83 13.8(t 19.35 7.26 2.4! 84 85 14.63 20.75 7.94 2.85




















hhl/tunie period. Reference Prices:I3/hhl c.i.f. U S in all periods bAllregions are based on ILLS BAIJ Case resultsthrough 1985 CUS demand.1986 2025. is based on SRl-(1Ej"Nominal Case" resultsas adjusted to conform to the price p:ith used inthis study. dDdafter 1985. is based on theassumption that the ratio to IJ S demand willhe Constant.
5OPEC demands increase at 3.5°per year from 1986 2025 irrespective ofprice 1AIl region's demandsare based on a 2.5° per year growthrate after 2025.
210Also, notethat theelasticities are defined in terms of a reference, or
aut0flbm0S.
time path Ofdemand. For example,' thC price were in-
creased by Onepercent from thereference price path and held one percent
higher for nperiodsthen demand ?!periods hence would be =
....
. percent lower than the referencedemand in that
period. Thedata giving thereference demand paths andand fi expu-
iitfltS forequation (6) arecontained in Table Ill-I.
B.Non.0PE(' OilSupply
NonOPEC crudeoil supply functions wereconstructed for North
America, theNorth Sea, and the restof the non-Communist world. The
Communist sector wasrepresented by price invariant ratesof exports to
the nonCOmmU1m5tworld.




where s,supply in year:
p,price in year I
s, p =reference path suppliesand prices
a = speedof adjustment of supplyto price
b = one-year priceelasticity
The reference supplypaths for the nonCon1mUniStcrude oil supply
regions through 1985 werethose generated bylEES. After 1985 therefer-
ence paths werebased on the primaryconstraint that thetotal cumulative
extraction, given a constant $13reference price path,should be equal to
best estimates of reservesplus undiscoveredrecoverable resources.The
time of ultimate depletion ineach region was chosen(by assumption) so
as to allow reasonablyshaped supply trajectories.Note that becausethe
supply function in equation(7) is used, if theactual price path were
higher (lower) than the referencepath, then cumulativeresources de-
pleted would he higher (lower) thanin the reference case.This represents,
although admittedly in an indirect way,the concept thatthe availability
of reserves is a function of price.(The maximumvariation in themodel
runs made above the baseestimate of 1.28 trillionbarrels was lO0c.)
The exponents in (7) werefitted to the lEESresults by the same
procedure as in the case of demand,
The data giving the referencecrude oil supplypaths, the a andb
parameters for equation (7),and the resourceavailability estimatesand
their sources are contained in Table111-2.
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*lf ti-year periods arc used, the exponents have to he modilied from a and h to a" and
h(I + a. ..'s a"'I) respectively.
Reference Crude Oil Supply Paths'
Units: l0 bhlsjtime period. Relerence Prices: SI 3/bbl c.i.f. U.S. in all periods.
'All ilgures are reserves plus undiscovered recoverable resources. The UnitedStates
estimate, including N(I I.s. is from 121. The Canadian and other world regions estimato
are from (71.
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73 75 8.54 07 3.14 80
75 77 9.15 .81 3.69 .85
77 79 9.97 1.99 4.42 .91
79 81 10.62 3.83 5.11 95
81 83 10.77 4.97 569 .95
83 85 10.91 5.41 6.48 .95
85 90 26.61 14.97 (6.94 2.37
90 95 26.10 15.70 18.62 2.37
95 00 2610 12.92 20.44 2.37
00 05 26.10 8.30 22.27 2.37
05 10 25.92 3.69 24.09 2,37
10 IS 22.45 0.33 24.82 237
IS 20 17.89 0.18 21.54 2.37
20 25 13.32 0.18 15.97 2.37
26 30 8.76 0.02 10.40 2.37
31 35 4.20 0.02 4.85 237
36 40 040 0.02 1.93 237
41 45 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.37
46 50 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.37
51 55 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.37
F spo nents
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250 67 206C. SyntheticLiquids Supply
Liquid synthetic fuels from coal and/or shale willeventually till the
demand for liquid fuels when oil supplies are exhaustedin thepresent
model. The liquid synthetic supply function is basedOn the SRI-GEM
results reported in [ill, a report specifically designed tomodel and fore-
cast the future development of the synthetic fuels industry.
The synthetic liquids supply function is representedby a function of
the same form as (7). The reference supply pathcomes from an SRI-
GEM scenario entitled "High Oil Shale Price." Thisscenario wa se-
lected to construct the base case reference supply path becauseit projects
virtually all synthetic liquids production to be coalbased; shale oil is
etfectivety eliminated. The SRI-GEM nominalcase projects a dominant
role for shale in the synthetic industry after the turn of thecentury. The
more conservative case has been chosen; that is, the one whichtends to
bias price estimates upward. Sensitivity runs have beenmade, however,
using the SRI-GEM nominal case for the referencesynthetics supply
trajectory. Since the SRI-GEM results pertain onlyto the U.S., and since
7O-75% of the world's coal resources lie outside the U.S., itWas assumed
that coal syncrude would be produced outside theU.S. as well. In the
reference case, U.S. synthetic liquids supplywas augumented by a con-
servative factor of 0.75 to estimate production in, andCommunist country
exports to, the rest of the world. Sensitivity runswere made using factors
of 0.50 and 1.00 as well. No non-U.S. productionwas assumed in the
sensitivity run based on shale oil availability.
The exponents in the supply functionwere also calibrated from the
SRI-GEM results using the same procedureas for oil supply and de-
mand.5 All relevant dataon synthetic liquids supply are contained in
Table 111-3.
D. OPEC Supply
The remaining data needed for the model of OPEC supply include the
extraction cost function C(Q,), the total resource availability ,and the
discount rate r. The OPEC extraction cost function is definedso that unit
extraction costs are an increasing function of cumulative depletion. Two
functional forms are reported here,a low and a high cost case. The two
forms are:
5The alternativeprice paths reported in SRI-GEM were not constant in time, but
maintained the same ratio over time, one to another, so that the same procedure reported










S nthetic I. it1tii&l
Speed of Adjustnient, a
(one year period)
One Year Flacticity, h
long RUFi Flasticity. h/I- a
Reference Synthetic liquids Supply andl'ricc Paths
Units: Reference prices: 1975 U.S. S/bhl. Supplies: l0hhls/periud.
hilased on SRI-GEM "1Jili Shale OilPrices" Scenario. Figures here are obtained by
muiliplyirig liquid synfuel quantities for U.S. by 1.75 toaccount for supplies from non-U S
sources.
13a.sed on SRI-GLM "Nominal ('aseT Figuresare not multiplied to account for non-
II .S. productian in this case.
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rime Period Reference I'rice
S nthetic I .i(1UidS Supply
Base ('aseb Sensitivity (asec


























86 90 14.87 0.46 1.25 91 95 15.70 1.33 3.18 9600 16.31 2.31 662 01 05 16.76 5.713 12.71 06 10 17.09 12.64 22.02 II 5 17.33 21.68 23.03 lb 20 17.51 23.71 43.83
21 25 17.64 27.84 54.49
26 30 17.73 33.88 66.30
31 35 17.80 41.21 80.66
36 40 17.85 58.14 98.13
41 45 17.89 61.01 119.39
46 50 17.92 7422 145.26








= 830 (billion bbls)
K0 = constant= 207.5
= constant = 20
High Cost Case:
C(Q1)=K1 +K2Q
K1= constant = .25
K, = constant(I .84)( l0)
Thc low cost form makes cost almost inversely proportional toresources
remaining. (The "e" constant in the denominator is to preventcost from
becoming infinite). The high cost case makes cost a quadratic functionof
cumulative supply. It cafl be seen in the table below that while both func.-
dons start and end at roughly equivalent costs, the quadratic formhas
much higher costs over the mid ranges of depletion:
Unit Cost of Extraction
Depletion of Low Cost













OPEC resource availability, Q, was estimated at 830 billion barrels. This
is the sum of proved plus prospective reserves, plus undiscovered, re-
coverable resources cited in a recent published estimate.6 Sensitivity runs
were made in which the expected figure for undiscovered recoverable re-
sources is shifted up and down by 50, giving overall resource availability
figures of 969 and 692 billion barrels respectively.
Discount rates were handled parametrically. Rates of 4, 6°and
8were used. The rate which should be used to be efficient is the real
marginal productivity of capital.
LWorld Crude ResourceMay Excccd 1,500 Billion Barrels." World Oil. September.
975: pp.48 -The figure cited above is the sum of estimates for the Mideast, North Africa.
the GulfofGujnea Northest South America and Southeast Asia in the article.
215IV. CosipiriTroNAND INTL RTIMI'ORAI EFEICLFNcY IN TuE
EMPRICAIMouir.
In section 1it was mentioned that the competitive solution to this
model would in general diverge from a true intertemporally cthcicnt so-
Intinn fliIn,'rdi nnt fliccoc itrfp'I fcr'ciiyht Thxi,
mand in period i depends on present and past, but not future pricesIn
another study (Marshalla E71) it has been concluded that the quantitative
difference between competitive and "true efficient" prices is small. There-
fore, for reasons of computational simplicity the results reported in this
study are those derived from the competitive model.
The approach in the above study is to maximize directly the social
surplus derived from usage of the resource. Thus, problem (C) of section
11 is replaced by problem (S) helos
Max fpi(q,,q7i.....q)dq,- ('(Q7)q(1 + r'
,
(Problem S)
Subject to: q1 > 0
Equation (1) is still used to compute demand and (2) is still required to
hold as in (C). The diflerence is that the condition in (3) which gives the
price when q > 0 is replaced by:







s, is particu!arly difficult to evaluate because the functions
p, =p,(q,,q11.....q1)
cannot be found in closed form; and, a change of variable is necessary
prior to integration. Also, the integral in s, is path dependent so that the
particular path used must be given an economic interpretation.1 (See
Willig (i 5])
7lhcre exists no continuous function W defined on intertemporal allocations such that
the demand functions used could he inteipreted as being the outcome of maximization of W.
Therefore, we are forced to define the social surplus integral itself to be the benefit function
in line with the "willingness-to-pay' criterion of value. The particular path selected, namcb
moving in order of subscripts each component of (q1,.... qr) from 0 to itsult;matc
value q7. is the only one which makes sense in this context
216Subject to some caveats from the above ISSUeS theconclusion of tle
cited study was that the differences in the price solutions ofproblem s to
problem Care at most ±5over the next fifteen years, and c°to
over the lifetimeofOPEC oil resources.
V. RESui.Ts
The principal finding of the study is that the clilcientworld price of
oil is far below the prevailing level for at least the next fifteenyears. The
results of the empirical model are that over a wide range ofvariations of
key parameters and assumptions the efficient real price5 of oil is bounded
inside the range:
$2 $7 in 1976-77
$5 -$12 in 1986 90
$26 $60 at the time of OPEC exhaustion
OPEC resources last between 45 and 60 years, by which timesynthetic
liquid fuels from coal and possibly, but not necessarily, shale haveconic
to dominate the liquid fuels market. In no case, however, is the synfuels
industry required to supply over 10 MMBD of liquid synfuelssooner than
30 years into the future or at a real price below $18 per barrel.
These results hold:
for real interest rates in the range 4-8,
for extraction cost assumptions that vary widely with respectto
rate of increase of cost,
for +50% variations in the expected level of OPEC undiscovered,
recoverable resources,
for large variatiois in assumptions on the price response, timing,
location and sources (coal, shale) of synthetic liquids,
and also for combinations of the above changes.
An attempt was made throughout the study to make assumptions and
define ranges of parameters conservatively relative to the principal con-
clusion. That is, when in doubt, choices were made which could tend to
bias the consequent price path upwards in early years.
Since a great deal of uncertainty is associated with several of the
model's parameters, a series of sensitivity runs have been performed. The
results of these tests are those alluded to in the opening paragraph of this
section. A sample of information from the sensitivity runs is contained in
Table V-I. The lirst column in Table V-I contains an index by which the
various runs can be referenced. The next four columns specify the param-
eter settings for each run (explained in the table footnotes). Columns 6 -8






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Units: Price. Costs1975 U.S. $/bhl
Cumulative Production109 bbls
Supply and F1nand Rates MMBL)
TABE.L V.2
6°/a 1)1souNT RA1t-IIlcI(..osi fIJN(liON
(RuN I:)
Conventional OPEC OPEC
Time FOB. Marginal User Scarcity Supply Cumulatjse
Period Price Cost Cost Rent Rate Producti
7677 4.29 0.26 2.86 1.18 33.06 24.13
- 7879 4.81 0.30 3.19 1.32 36.95 51.1
80-81 5.37 0.37 3.52 1.49 39.04 79.61
82 83 6.01 0.47 3.86 1.67 42.37 110.54
84 85 6.71 0.63 4.20 1.88 45.42 143.69
86 90 8.45 1.22 4.94 2.30 4.75 229.01
91 95 10.84 2.12 5.64 3.09 49.02 318.47
96 00 13.67 3.40 6.15 4.12 52.36 414.03
01 05 6.89 5.10 6.28 5.51 5443 513 36
06-10 20.48 7.21 5.89 7.38 55.72 615.05
IIIS 24.10 9.43 4.90 9.87 49.94 706'O
16 20 28.05 11.59 3.26 13.21 43.17 784.99
21 25 31.85 12.87 1.31 17.67 23.59 82804
Demand
Time North Other Other N-OPEC NCinn. World
Period America OECD N-OECD OPEC Total
76 77 20.12 21.35 7.76 1.95 5118
78 79 21.29 24.93 8.84 2.36 57.42
80-81 22.04 23.07 9.84 2.70 62.65
82-83 23.28 30.51 10.87 3.30 67.96
84 85 24.24 32.65 11.84 3.90 72.(j4
86 90 24.75 34.17 12.55 4.40 75.87
91 95 25.78 36.49 13.64 5.22 8107
9600 26.63 38.76 14.18 6.21 86.38
01 05 27.22 40.53 15.78 7.37 90.90
06-10 28.97 44.00 17.48 8.76 99.21 IiIS 30.94 47.78 19.34 10.40 108.46
16-20 32.80 51.43 21.17 12.35 117.75




Fime North North Othe Synthetic Crun. N-OPECOjI
Period America Sea N-OPEC Liquids Exports Production
76 77 11.45 0.99 4.57 0.01 1.16 1243 7879 11.74 2.36 5.19 0.01 1.24 26.50 80 81 12.02 4.55 5.86 0.02 1.30 4288lABLI V-2 (Co.finiee/)
show, respectively, the initial price(19761977), the price in the1986 90 period, and the highest price ever attainedThe last column tellswhen
OPEC runs out of oil.
To provide a point of reference,a particular intermediate settingof parameters, run E in the table, has been designatedthe "base case"run,
although we offer no claims as to its being "mostlikely." Parameters in
other runs which have been varied from their settingin run E are in paren-
theses in the table. The base case, run E,uses the quadratic (high) extrac-
tion cost function, a 6discount rate, 830 billion barrels forOPEC resource
availability and the coal-based synthetics referencesupply path. Table V-2
presents the detailed results for the basecase run. The most striking result,
which can be observed in the second column, isthat price over the next 15
years is very low compared to current prices. Theprice for the initial
period, 1976 to 1977, is seen to be only$4.29 per barrel, and it rises to
only $8.45 by 1990. Thereafter, price doescontinue to rise steadily for 35
more years, reaching a high of $31.85per barrel when OPEC runs out of
oil in the year 2025.
It is interesting to observe the marginalcost and scarcity rent com-
ponents of the optimal prices listed in columns (3-5) of thetable. The full
marginal cost is seen to be dominated by theuser costs (the second term of
equation (4)) over most of the time horizon. Usercost is calculated at
$2.86 in the initial periodcompared to only $0.26 for current marginal
cost, the actual out-of-pocket unitcost of extraction. The current mar-
ginal cost rises continuallywith increasing cumulative depletion (by
definition of the extraction-cost function),but the user cost can be seen to
level off and decline eventually.
9The table doesnot list any data for years alter OPEC has exhausted its oil resources,
although the model is solvedover its lull 80 year time horiton in all cases.
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Time North North Other Cumulative
Period Amerli.d Set N OPt (
Synthetic Crnn. N-OpEC Oil I iquid
ProdulIR) 1
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I 1.26 0.55 I 30 245 53
06-10 16.19 2.23
13.07 2.32 1.30 305.50
15.19 0.21
14.99 8.74 1.30 3,47 lI-IS 16.26 25.11 1.30 424.25 16-20 13.04 0.12 14.80 44.90 I 30
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Figure v-IBase CaseRun F
This eventual decline of the user cost occurs because thenum-
ber of future barrels of oil whose extraction costs are aflected bycurrent
production decreases as the ultimate exhaustion date is neared. Thus,the
current cost eventually conies to represent a larger and larger share ofthe
marginal cost, reaching 100 percent on the very last barrel depleted.
The optimal initial scarcity rent can be seen in column5 to be only
SI. 18. This rent rises at the interest rate of 6°over the whole period dur-
ing which OPEC produces oil. By the last period, the royalty hasgrown to
$17.67 per barrel. The optimal price path, broken intoits marginal cost
and royalty components is illustrated graphically inFigure V-I.
OPEC supply rates (which include indigenous use)in column 6. can
be seen to be rather high by historical standards.They begin at almost
33 MMBD and rise to 45 MMBD by 1985.The highest rate ever reached
is 56 MMBD in the 2006 2010 period.
Demands and supplies from the variousregions in the rest of the
world can be observedin the second and third blocks of the table. They
are fairly self-explanatory. The syntheticssupply results (column S of the
third block of the table), however,deserve special comment. Synthetic
liquids can be seen to play virtuallyno role in the world liquid fuels
market prior to the year 2000.Supply does not exceedI MMBD until
after that year. However, insubsequent years the results representa rapid
buildup of the industry andreflect high price elasticity of supply.so that
222
I I
2I5 '125(Ifas oil reserves in OPEC and the rest of the world
decline,ynthelj liquids from coal COfl1C to dOnhit2ttthe liquid fue!smarket Thcper- centages of total world demand for liquid fuels
Supplied bySynthetic liquids over the latter half of the problemare given in the foflowingtable:
Pcrceiit of liquid fuel
demand supplied by
Time Period Synthetics






Note that OPEC and non-OPEC oil supplierseach Continue tosupply about l8of world demand in thereriod 202l to 2025. howeverOPEC
has essentially exhausted its resources by theend of this period andsup- plies nothing in the next five-year period(not reported in tableV-I).
Non-OPEC suppliers (who possesssome higher cost resources) docon-
tinue to supply a minor part of world demandfor about tenmore years
beyond 2025.
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